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Abstract 
We exploit the 2017 introduction of Payment Practices Disclosure Regulation in the United Kingdom to 
examine the effects of mandating disclosure on customer-supplier payment practices. We find that large 
firms reduce their accounts payable by 12.7% while non-disclosing small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) reduce their accounts receivable by 11.3%. Cross-sectional tests indicate that higher expected 
reputational costs are an important channel driving the change in payment practices. Further, SMEs with 
stronger competitive positions and lower financial constraints are better able to capture the benefits. We 
also find evidence suggesting economic efficiency gains: SMEs reduced short-term debt by approximately 
3.5% and were awarded an additional 4.5% in government contracts. Lastly, newly disclosed information 
shows that large firms accelerate payments and increase the fraction of invoices paid within agreed terms. 
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1. Introduction 
More than 80% of world trade relies on trade credit (World Trade Organization). While financing firm 
operations through suppliers is customary, inefficiencies can arise when buyers do not pay within agreed 
terms or when large creditworthy companies finance themselves through their less creditworthy, smaller 
suppliers.1 These inefficiencies are especially challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
that have limited access to financing. In this paper, we study the effects of disclosure regulation on payment 
practices. Specifically, we exploit the introduction of the Payment Practices Disclosure Regulation 
(hereafter, PPDR) in the United Kingdom (U.K.) to examine whether requiring firms to disclose 
information about trade-credit payment practices influences when and how small suppliers are paid by their 
large customers. 
Although securing timely payments from customers is a concern for firms of all sizes, prior research 
suggests that smaller companies are more likely to experience late payments, resulting in financial distress 
and foregone investment and growth (Murfin and Njoroge, 2015; J. N. Barrot, 2016; Fabbri and Klapper, 
2016). SMEs face the challenge of doing business with large customers that have greater bargaining power 
to negotiate favorable prices and payment terms; such customers also have greater legal resources with 
which to defend themselves if an action for late payment is brought to court. To mitigate these challenges, 
the U.K. introduced PPDR in 2017. This regulation requires large U.K. firms to disclose detailed 
information about their payment practices relating to U.K.-based contracts. The required disclosures include 
statistics such as the average number of days a firm takes to pay its suppliers and the fraction of invoices 
that are not paid within agreed terms, as well as narrative information such as how the firm deals with 
disputes regarding payments. Firms must submit this information to the U.K. Government, which publishes 
it on a publicly available website.2 
                                                          
1 In the Americas, the fraction of business-to-business (B2B) overdue invoices was greater than 48% in 2017 (Atradius, 
2017).  
2 See: https://publish-payment-practices.service.gov.uk  
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The stated objective of PPDR was to help small U.K. suppliers obtain improved payment terms 
from large customers (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, (DBEIS, 2017)). However, 
previous efforts in this area by U.K. regulators failed to achieve the desired results. Hence, ex-ante, it was 
unclear whether PPDR would be successful.3 There are a few reasons why disclosure might not impact 
customer-supplier contracts. First, given that customers and suppliers typically play a repeated game where 
interactions occur frequently over time, suppliers likely have accurate expectations of the payment behavior 
of each of their customers, which they can incorporate into the transaction price. As a result, mandating that 
customers disclose payment terms may not affect negotiations between customers and suppliers. Second, 
disclosure might not lead to changes in payment terms because customers derive real benefits such as 
reduced financing needs (or even generating financing income) by delaying payments to their suppliers. 
These benefits might outweigh the costs associated with public disclosure of payment terms. Finally, the 
disclosure might also prove ineffective due to the preexistence of alternate sources of payment practices 
information like firm financial statements and credit agency reports.4  
Alternatively, the new disclosure rule may affect the equilibrium via two different mechanisms. 
First, a particular supplier can use the newly disclosed data to learn about how their customers pay their 
other suppliers. Access to this information could improve suppliers’ bargaining position.5 For example, 
learning that a customer typically pays its suppliers in 25 days might lead a supplier that receives payments 
in 55 days to renegotiate and seek faster repayment. Second, after the passage of this rule, customers’ 
payment terms become publicly available, and customers with poor payment practices could suffer from 
negative publicity and reputational damage. Customers may therefore alter payment practices in response 
to public pressure (or the threat of it). Regulators explicitly stated in the regulatory documents that they 
anticipated behavioral change from PPDR as a result of public pressure, usage of the reports by suppliers, 
                                                          
3 In Section 2, we provide a brief overview of previous efforts by U.K. regulators to influence payment practices. 
4 Although information sources such as credit agency reports are costly to obtain, especially for SMEs, they might 
already provide some of the information PPDR intends to make public and hence dampen the effect of the regulation. 
5 Consistent with the model developed by Admati and Pfleiderer (2000), this is a likely reason why firms do not 
voluntarily disclose detailed payment practices.  
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and responsible companies leading the way and encouraging best-in-class payment practices (DBEIS, 
2018). Ultimately, whether and how the disclosure of payment practices affects customer-supplier relations 
is an empirical question. 
This setting also presents a number of desirable features from a research-design perspective. Firms 
started disclosing payment practices at different points in time throughout 2017, 2018, and 2019 according 
to their fiscal year-end month.6 This staggered adoption of PPDR allows us to use (high-dimensional) time 
fixed effects, which alleviates concerns that our results are spuriously driven by concurrent but unrelated 
market-wide events, such as other economic, regulatory, or institutional changes (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). 
In our primary specification, we estimate the effects of disclosures of payment practices by comparing 
changes in accounts payable between disclosing and non-disclosing firms in the U.K. The identifying 
variation in this generalized difference-in-differences (DID) design comes from firms that meet the arbitrary 
reporting thresholds stipulated by PPDR.7 Moreover, smaller firms are not subject to the additional 
disclosure requirements but can benefit from the increased transparency of their larger customers. 
Therefore, we also compare changes in accounts receivable between SMEs (not subject to additional 
disclosure requirements) and large firms to examine whether SMEs – the intended beneficiaries of PPDR 
– have lower accounts-receivable balances following increased disclosure from large firms. 
In our main analysis, we examine the effects of PPDR on firms that are subject to the new disclosure 
requirements (hereafter, large firms). In addition to the reasons cited above, another reason we may not be 
able to detect effects for large firms is that many of these firms have significant international operations 
                                                          
6 The earliest mandated reporters were firms with an April year-end; the first payment-terms reports from these firms 
were due on November 30, 2017. Firms with a different year-end month were granted additional time. For example, 
the first reports for firms with a December 31, 2017 year-end were due on July 30, 2018. The full schedule of first-
year reports is found on page 20 of the Guidance document: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/649941/payment-
practices-performance-reporting-requirements-oct-2017.pdf  
7 Firms had to meet two of the following three criteria in the most recent two fiscal years to be subject to the increased 
disclosure requirements: 1) sales greater than £36 million (USD $43m), 2) assets greater than £18 million (USD 
$21m), and 3) more than 250 employees. 
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and contracts with non-U.K. suppliers that fall outside the scope of the regulation.8 Alternatively, given 
that nearly 84% of U.K. companies surveyed by Atradius in 2015 claim “uniform payment practices” across 
all their customers, there may be spillover effects from U.K.-based suppliers to non-U.K.-based suppliers, 
resulting in a detectable change in overall payment behaviors. The results of our analyses suggest that large 
firms do not, on average, decrease their accounts payable as a ratio of their revenues (A/P). However, we 
find that large firms with a significant proportion of U.K.-based revenues decreased A/P by 12.7% on 
average following PPDR. This finding suggests that following increased transparency of payment practices, 
large firms with significant operations in the U.K. reduced the time they took to pay their suppliers. We 
also examine whether SMEs benefitted from this indirect treatment. We document a statistically significant 
reduction in accounts receivable as a ratio of revenues (A/R) for SMEs. In addition, we find a reduction of 
11.3% A/R for the subset of SMEs with a higher fraction of U.K. revenues. This finding is consistent with 
SMEs receiving faster repayment from customers following the regulation, resulting in lower A/R.9 
Additional tests suggest that the parallel trends assumption is valid and that alternative non-regulatory 
explanations for our results are unlikely (see Figure 1). 
 Next, we perform cross-sectional tests on large firms to analyze the mechanisms through which 
PPDR changed payment behaviors. First, information about payment practices revealed in the reports may 
exert pressure through public shaming and may discipline firms by increasing their expected reputational 
costs (e.g., Rauter 2017; Dyreng, Hoopes, and Langetieg 2018; Dyck and Zingales 2005). This societal and 
public pressure is particularly effective if end-consumers purchase directly from firms because they can 
punish firms for unfair payment practices by not purchasing their products. This pressure may also be more 
effective if the firm receives more media attention and coverage from the business press. To test this 
                                                          
8 As described in section 2, the mandated disclosures relate to contracts with “a significant connection with the U.K.”, 
which typically means that the contract will be performed in the U.K., or where both parties are established in the 
U.K. or carry out a relevant part of their business in the U.K.  
9 An alternative denominator for our A/P variable is cost of goods sold (COGS), which would help capture days 
payable. We scale accounts payable by revenues to be consistent across our A/R and A/P variables. However, in 
untabulated robustness tests we scale A/R by COGS and find similar results in terms of economic and statistical 
significance.  
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channel, we assess whether changes in payment behavior are concentrated in firms that sell their products 
to end-consumers (business-to-consumer firms or B2C) and firms that receive more media attention. Using 
retail firms as our proxy for B2C, we document that B2C firms with significant U.K. operations decreased 
A/P by an additional 14.6%. Moreover, large firms with high media attention, captured by the number of 
mentions that a firm receives in the business press, reduce their A/P significantly.  This suggests that 
increase in reputational costs is an important mechanism through which PPDR generated changes in 
payment practices. Importantly, we do not detect behavioral changes in the period between the 
announcement of the regulation and payment reports being released, suggesting that firms underestimated 
the reputational and regulatory costs of PPDR. 
 We also conduct cross-sectional tests for SMEs to investigate which firms primarily benefit from 
PPDR. We document that SMEs with relatively stronger competitive positions experienced larger decreases 
in A/R and that the decline in A/R was accentuated for firms with lower cash constraints (or higher cash 
balances as a fraction of total assets). Although regulators intended for PPDR to benefit SMEs with poor 
negotiating positions and cash flow concerns (DBEIS, 2017), our results indicate that SMEs with stronger 
competitive positions and greater financial resources prior to PPDR were more successful in obtaining 
improved payment terms from their suppliers following PPDR. This suggests that a number of threats on 
the part of the supplier – for instance, the threat of walking away from the contractual relationship, the 
threat of pursuing legal action for late payment, or the threat of publicizing unfair treatment – were made 
increasingly credible by the transparency of payment records and the increased regulatory support for fair 
payment practices.10  
 An important motivation for the regulators’ objective to improve payment practices for SMEs is 
economic efficiency.  For one, late payment forces small companies to increase short-term borrowings to 
                                                          
10 Anecdotal evidence suggests that such threats did, in fact, materialize. Since PPDR came into effect, the Office of 
the Small Business Commissioner (SBC) has seen an increase in the number of late payment cases brought to their 
attention from small companies who, in the past, were reluctant to challenge their large customers. Since PPDR, the 
SBC has mediated thousands of late-payment cases and has helped resolve payment disputes worth £400,000 with 
larger businesses (The Guardian, 2019). 
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finance working capital. In addition, delayed payment hinders growth, preventing SMEs from bidding on 
large contracts that require high levels of competitiveness and funding needs. We assess whether PPDR 
resulted in improvements in economic efficiency by examining changes to short-term debt and contracts 
awarded to SMEs. We document that following PPDR, SMEs experienced a decrease in short-term debt 
scaled by assets of 3.3% to 3.7% relative to large firms, with the majority of this decrease being due to 
lower short-term financing by SMEs rather than higher short-term financing by large firms. We also find 
that SMEs experienced an increase of 4.5% in the value of U.K. government contracts awarded relative to 
large firms. Again, our results suggest that the majority of this result is due to larger contracts being awarded 
to SMEs following PPDR, rather than changes to contracts awarded to large firms. Additional analyses 
suggest that this result is not likely being driven by an increase in the supply of contracts that SMEs can 
bid on in the post-PPDR period.  
Finally, we utilize the information disclosed by large firms in their payment practices reports to 
provide a more nuanced understanding of how firms changed their payment behaviors following PPDR. 
Our analyses show that for each subsequent payment report released by a firm (there are at most four reports 
available per firm at the time of our analysis), firms reduced the fraction of invoices not paid within the 
contractually agreed time by 1.5%. This finding is economically significant, as the mean fraction of invoices 
not paid within the agreed terms is 31%. We also document a significant shift in payment periods. Our 
estimates suggest that the average firm with significant U.K. operations accelerated payment of 4% of their 
invoices to within 30 days, while reducing the fraction of invoices paid between 31-60 days and over 60 
days by 2.2% and 1.7%, respectively. 
Our study contributes to two strands of literature. The first examines the effects of disclosure 
regulation on firms’ decision-making.11 Extant research documents that mandated disclosure generates real 
effects or “changes in behavior in the real economy (e.g., investment, use of resources, consumption)” 
owing to the improved transparency that contracting stakeholders use to influence the reporting firm’s 
                                                          
11 Prior work studying the effects of disclosure regulation focuses on firm-level investment (Cheng et al., 2013; Rauter, 
2017), internal capital allocation (Cho, 2015), mine safety (Christensen et al., 2017), and bank failures (Granja, 2018). 
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decisions (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). Our study differs from prior work in two important ways. First, in our 
setting, suppliers already possess private information about the payment practices of their customers and 
rationally incorporate this information into the equilibrium price. Consequently, we study whether 
information about the average payment practices of a given customer – which allows suppliers to 
benchmark their terms relative to those of other suppliers – improves the ability to negotiate better terms. 
Second, unlike prior research, which mainly focuses on the effects for disclosing firms, our setting allows 
us to also examine the effects on the intended beneficiaries of the regulation. 
We also contribute to the strand of research that studies customer-supplier payment practices. 
Payment practices, despite being a central element of customer-supplier relationships, have received little 
attention in prior literature as contract-level data is typically not available (Mian and Smith, 1992).12 
Existing research documents the adverse consequences of long payment terms, which include financial 
distress, liquidity risk and lower investment at the supplier level (Murfin and Njoroge, 2015; J.-N. Barrot, 
2016; Costello, 2018); in contrast, accelerated payments increase suppliers’ ability to hire new employees 
and increase existing workers’ compensation (Barrot and Nanda 2016). Prior work also documents that 
large, important customers with strong bargaining power relative to their suppliers are more likely to extend 
the payment period and generate overdue payments (Klapper et al., 2012; Fabbri and Klapper, 2016). 
However, little is known about how suppliers can improve payment conditions. To our knowledge, we are 
the first to document that transparency on customer payment practices is an effective tool for reducing 
payment durations and improving payment terms. 
The results of our paper also have important implications for policy makers around the world. 
Beyond the U.K., late payment practices make headlines in the European Union, South America, China, 
and the United States. In some instances, these practices have led to substantial research endeavors and 
interventions by governmental organizations. In 2006, for example, Chile limited the trade credit terms that 
                                                          
12 Moreover, suppliers are an important source of financing for most firms, with accounts receivable representing over 
20% of the total assets of the average firm in Compustat. 
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a large retailer could obtain from its small suppliers (Breza and Liberman, 2017). At the same time, 
disclosure regulation has increasingly become the “weapon of choice” for regulators whose objective is to 
allow market forces to change firm behavior by removing information asymmetry frictions. Although 
suppliers already have reasonable expectations for the payment terms of their customers based on past 
transactions, our study shows that disclosure can be an effective way to shift the balance of power between 
suppliers and customers via disciplining channels such as public pressure and information about payment 
practices, which suppliers can use to negotiate better terms. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the setting. Section 3 presents the 
data. Section 4 presents the main empirical analyses and results. Section 5 further examines the payment 
practices disclosure reports. Section 6 presents additional robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.  
2. Setting 
In December 2016, the U.K.’s Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (DBEIS) adopted 
regulations made under Section 3 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015; these 
regulations introduce a duty on the U.K.’s largest companies and LLPs to report their payment practices, 
policies, and performance for financial years beginning on or after April 6, 2017. The mandated disclosure 
requirements affect companies that exceed at least two of the following three thresholds in the previous two 
financial years: 1) sales greater than £36 million, 2) assets in excess of £18 million, and 3) more than 250 
employees. Covered firms are required to submit a report every six months within 30 days of their usual 
semiannual fiscal year end date describing payment terms related to contracts for goods, services, or 
intangible property that have a significant connection to the U.K.13 Contracts for financial services are 
excluded from the reporting requirements, including insurance-related services and banking services. 
                                                          
13 Whether a contract has a significant connection with the U.K. depends on the circumstances. However, examples 
would include a contract that will be performed in the U.K., or where one or both parties is established in the U.K. or 
conducts a significant part of their business in the U.K. (DBEIS, 2017). 
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The disclosure requirements can be broadly categorized into three groups: statistics, narrative, and 
check-the-box statements. The main statistics required to be disclosed are (1) the average number of days 
taken to make payments to suppliers, (2) the fraction of payments that were paid in 30 days or less, between 
31 and 60 days, and in 61 days or longer, and (3) the percentage of payments that were not paid within the 
agreed terms. Firms are also required to provide narrative descriptions of standard payment terms (including 
contractual length of time for payment of invoices and maximum contractual payment period) and the 
process for resolving payment disputes. Last, the check-the-box statements include whether suppliers are 
offered e-invoicing and whether supply chain finance is available to suppliers.14 
The regulation also dictates that submitted reports will be publicly accessible on a web-based 
service provided by the government. All qualifying entities within a business group are required to submit 
a report. In other words, each individual entity that meets the size thresholds is required to report, with no 
option for consolidated reporting. To ensure compliance, the Government considers the failure to publish a 
payment practices report within the specified filing period as a criminal offense by the business and every 
director of the company. Reports containing misleading, false, or deceptive information are also considered 
criminal offenses.15 
PPDR came as a response to concerns about the financial burden faced by SMEs that are not paid 
on time. Using survey data, the DBEIS found that late payment is a concern for 55% of SMEs (DBEIS, 
2018). Moreover, over half of SMEs that experience late payments wait a month or longer beyond the 
agreed terms to be paid, and nearly a quarter of U.K. businesses report that late payments are a threat to 
their survival. The regulatory documents also relayed findings from research conducted by the U.K. 
Federation of Small Businesses which found that 37% of small businesses face cash flow difficulties owing 
                                                          
14 Supply chain finance refers to cases where the supplier receives the payment from a finance provider or other 
third party rather than from the qualifying company. If the supplier receives the full amount due, then the date on 
which the supplier received the payment can be reported as the date of payment. 
15 A research report issued by the Government to quantify the costs of the regulation estimated that the average cost 
at the individual company level is £9,895 for “initial one-off costs including familiarization with the proposed new 
requirements, information gathering, IT costs and changes to processes” and £4,071 for “ongoing annual costs 
including maintaining systems and processes and preparing, collating, approving and submitting reports twice yearly.” 
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to late payment; 20% report that late payment has caused a profit slowdown; and an estimated tens of 
thousands of U.K. businesses are failing each year due to late payments (DBEIS, 2017). 
PPDR is the “most stringent action taken by the U.K. to address the issue” (Alvarez and Marsal, 
2017); it is not, however, the first effort to improve payment practices in the U.K. In 1998, the Late Payment 
of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act created a statutory framework for addressing late payment and 
providing suppliers the right to charge interest on late payment and reclaim administrative costs for pursuing 
late payment. In 2008, the Chartered Institute of Credit Management (on behalf of Government) established 
the Prompt Payment Code (the Code) to promote a culture of prompt payment. Signatories to the Code 
agreed to pay 95% of invoices within 60 days and work towards 30 days as normal practice; they also 
committed to other standards of good practice, such as not retroactively changing payment terms.16 
Although the Code demonstrated the intentions of its signatories, payment records were not reported.  
The survey results summarized above suggest that these previous regulations were not particularly 
effective at improving payment terms for SMEs. Unequal bargaining power between SMEs and their large 
customers meant that SMEs were reluctant to use existing legislation to pursue late payments or to challenge 
the status of a signatory to the Code (DBEIS, 2017). Although the intent of PPDR is for transparency to 
yield public pressure and allow SMEs to improve their bargaining position (DBEIS, 2018), the muted 
effects of these prior regulatory efforts raises questions as to whether PPDR will result in improved payment 
terms for SMEs and increases the possibility that PPDR will not produce a change in payment practices for 
large, disclosing firms.17 
 
                                                          
16 Over 2,000 organizations were signatories to the Code as of September 2018. The Code’s signatories make a public 
commitment to pay on time and pay fairly. Signing the Code acts as a signal of quality in terms of payment practices 
for other businesses considering doing business with the signatory businesses and also provides a statement of good 
practice within the business community. 
17 Given the lack of proximity between the timing of these actions and the regulation we are studying (i.e., 1998 and 
2008, whereas PPDR came into effect in 2017), we do not expect these actions to confound the effects of PPDR. Our 
parallel trends results and falsification tests in prior years further rule out the possibility of our results being 
confounded by these previous regulations. 
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3. Data 
We obtain data on firms’ financial characteristics from Bloomberg, as it provides us with the most 
comprehensive set of required data on both public and private firms incorporated in the U.K. To extract the 
data from Bloomberg, we take the following steps. First, we filter firms based on their country of 
incorporation and keep firms that (1) were in operation as of 2016 and (2) are incorporated in the United 
Kingdom.18 At this stage, we keep both public and private firms. Second, we impose a data availability 
requirement for our key variables: accounts payable, accounts receivable, revenues and assets. In the steps 
where we run the difference-in-differences specifications, we only keep observations from firms where 
revenues and total assets are available for the years used to assign treatment and control status. Finally, we 
drop firms in financial services and utilities, as their operations are significantly different from other firms. 
Moreover, financial contracts were not covered under PPDR. The panel for our main analyses includes 
approximately 12,000 firm-year observations from 1,200 firms over the 2009 to 2018 period.  
We also obtain data about payment practices from the reports mandated by PPDR. We download 
the payment reports from https://check-payment-practices.service.gov.uk/export and delete observations 
with a duplicate company number and filing date. Our tests are limited to examining how companies change 
their payment practices from one report to the next because, by construction, there are no reports during the 
period prior to PPDR. Consequently, we remove 1,034 reports from firms that have only filed one report 
as of June 2019. The final sample comprises over 13,000 observations from 5,812 unique firms. 
Finally, we download contract data between U.K. government agencies and their suppliers from 
https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder. Since 2015, U.K. government agencies must publish procurement 
opportunities and contracts awarded (over £10,000) on Contracts Finder, a website administered by the 
Government. We download contracts from 2015 to 2019, which provides us with over 68,000 contracts 
from 2,635 different U.K. government agencies and 5,825 unique U.K. suppliers. 
                                                          
18 We impose these restrictions, as they match the requirements set by the PPDR of meeting the specified size 
thresholds for the previous two years. 
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4. Empirical Analysis and Results 
4.1. Empirical Methodology 
We examine how the disclosure requirements imposed by PPDR affected firms using a difference-in-
differences methodology. We separately estimate the effects on the disclosing firms (i.e., large firms) and 
the intended beneficiaries of the regulation (i.e., SMEs). More specifically, we examine whether the PPDR 
led to changes in Accounts Payable for large firms and in Accounts Receivable for SMEs. The basic 
regression we use to estimate the effect on large firms is as follows: 
𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖, (1) 
where the dependent variable 𝐴𝐴/𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is accounts payable scaled by revenues for firm 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡. The 
independent variable for the first difference, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, takes the value of 1 for firms that meet the minimum 
size thresholds set by the regulation (i.e., firms with assets over £18 m and sales over £36 m in the previous 
two fiscal years) and 0 otherwise.19 The second independent variable, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, takes the value of 1 beginning 
with the disclosure of payment practices reports in November 2017 and 0 otherwise. It is important to note 
that the regulation affected firms in a staggered fashion depending on their fiscal year end, so 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 can 
take the value of 1 and 0 in the same month for two different firms. The variables 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 denote firm 
and year fixed effects, respectively. In all the regressions, we cluster standard errors at the firm level. 
As described earlier, it is ex-ante difficult to predict the effect of PPDR on large firms. Many firms 
have significant operations outside of the U.K. and contracts with non-U.K. suppliers that fall outside of 
the disclosure requirements. As a result, we might not find an effect on the payment practices of those firms. 
However, it is possible that if firms improve payment practices with their U.K. suppliers, this could 
                                                          
19 Regulation PPDR also includes a threshold in terms of number of employees. We ignore this threshold, as number 
of employees is largely unavailable for our sample. However, we conduct two (untabulated) tests to mitigate concerns 
relating to this research choice. First, we analyze the distribution of the number of employees for the firms for which 
these data are available. We find that in 2016, over 95% of the firms that met the assets and revenue thresholds also 
met the number-of-employees threshold. Second, we rerun our regression models using only treated firms that we 
could match to a firm in the payment practices report. We obtain similar results. Finally, note that even if we 
erroneously classify a subset of firms as small when they are in fact large, this would bias against finding an effect. 
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influence the payment practices for their other, non-U.K. suppliers (i.e., a spill-over effect).20 A challenge 
in our setting is the inability to observe whether firms’ accounts-payable balances are owed to their U.K. 
suppliers or to their non-U.K. suppliers. Therefore, we first estimate the effect of PPDR on the full set of 
firms that are mandated to disclose, without discerning whether more or less of their business is U.K.-based. 
Then, we re-estimate the effect on firms with significant U.K. operations to assess whether these firms have 
a stronger response to PPDR. In particular, we use geographic segment data from Worldscope to identify 
firms with significant operations in the U.K.21 We create a firm-specific, time-invariant indicator,𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 
that takes the value of one if more than a third of the firm’s revenues (averaged over the sample period) 
originated in the U.K., which is the threshold used by S&P’s Global Market Intelligence and Geographic 
Segment Analysis products to classify high exposure to a certain region or country.22 Our assumption is 
that firms with high U.K.-based revenues contract more with other U.K. firms and will therefore respond 
more strongly to PPDR. In our main analyses, we present the results of this test, specifically the 
interaction 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 for the subsample of 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 firms, alongside the results for large firms. 
To examine the effect of the regulation on SMEs, we estimate the following regression: 
𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄ = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖, (2) 
where the dependent variable 𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡⁄  is defined as accounts receivable scaled by total revenues. We set the 
value of  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 to 1 for firms that do not meet the size requirements in terms of assets or revenues set by 
the regulation and 0 otherwise. Although we anticipate that the majority of smaller U.K. firms will 
                                                          
20 Nearly 84% of surveyed U.K. companies claim to have consistent payment practices across all customers – 
regardless of size or location – suggesting that spill-overs from improved payment practices for one set of customers 
are plausible (Atradius, 2015). 
21 Publicly-traded U.K. companies are required to apply IFRS (which includes the IFRS 8 “Operating Segments” 
standard). Private U.K. companies can adopt EU IFRS or UK GAAP, both of which also require segment reporting. 
Although firms may choose to disclose segment data based on products/services rather than geographic markets, close 
to 92% of our sample reports geographic segment data.  
22 See the product manuals, which can be accessed through the platforms (by subscription) on 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/solutions/market-intelligence-platform. Our results are similar if we 
define High UK using different thresholds, such as more than 50% of sales originating from the U.K.  
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conduct their business primarily in the U.K., we also estimate equation (2) for the subset of firms with 
significant operations in the U.K., or 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 firms. 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the observations in our sample. We winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1 and 99 percentiles and calculate ratios using the winsorized variables. Panel A of Table 1 
reports descriptive statistics for the full sample. The average firm in our sample has assets of £740 m and 
annual revenues of £621 m. These statistics are substantially different for the 50.04% (49.96%) of firms 
defined as large (SMEs) under the PPDR. Large firms (SMEs) have on average £1.4bn (£34 m) in assets 
and £1.2bn (£11 m) in revenues. In terms of trade credit, the average firm in our sample has £55 m in 
accounts payable and £58.7 m in accounts receivable. Large firms hold £105 m in accounts payable and 
£108m in accounts receivable. In contrast, SMEs hold £1.5 m in accounts payable and £1.9 m in accounts 
receivable.   
 The average firm in our sample has short-term debt (as a percentage of total assets) of 7%, with 
large firms owing 5% of total assets and SMEs owing 9%. The mean (median) percentage of U.K.-
originated revenues for the full sample is 34% (33%). As expected, large firms have more of their revenues 
originating outside of the U.K. than do SMEs; large firms have median U.K.-originated sales of 20%, while 
this figure is 46% for SMEs. 
4.3. Main Results 
We report the main results of equations (1) and (2) in Table 2. The coefficient on 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 in column 
1 estimates the effect of the regulation on 𝐴𝐴/𝑃𝑃 (accounts payable scaled by total assets) for the full set of 
large firms in our sample that are subject to the new disclosure requirements. After the increased 
transparency of payment practices, we do not find a statistically significant effect on large firms’ accounts 
payable relative to firms that are not mandated to disclose. This result indicates that our full sample of large 
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firms is insufficiently exposed to the U.K., or that the effects of PPDR on payment behaviors with U.K.-
suppliers did not spill-over to non-U.K. suppliers. 
In column 2 of Table 2, we estimate the effect of the regulation on the subsample of large firms 
with significant U.K. operations. Consistent with our conjecture, the coefficient on 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 for 
HighUK firms is negative and significant (coef. = -0.127, std. error = 0.057). The coefficient estimate 
suggests that 𝐴𝐴/𝑃𝑃 of large firms whose operations are focused on the U.K. decreased by 12.7% following 
increased transparency of payment practices. After the introduction of the regulation, large firms with 
significant U.K. operations reduced the time they took to pay their suppliers, resulting in a lower accounts-
payable balance as a ratio of revenues. 
Although PPDR does not require SMEs to increase transparency or change their payment practices, 
they are the intended beneficiaries of the regulation. Therefore, it is important to understand whether SMEs 
indeed benefitted from this indirect treatment. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 report the effect of PPDR on 
𝐴𝐴/𝑅𝑅 (accounts receivable scaled by revenues) for SMEs. In column 3, the coefficient estimate on 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ×
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 suggests that following PPDR, SMEs experienced a statistically significant reduction in 𝐴𝐴/𝑅𝑅 of 19.9% 
relative to large firms that were mandated to report their payment practices. In column 4, we estimate the 
model on the subsample of firms with significant U.K. operations and find a statistically significant 
reduction in 𝐴𝐴/𝑅𝑅 of 11.3%. These results are consistent with SMEs receiving faster payments from their 
customers following the increase in transparency of payment practices by large firms. 
4.4. Announcement Effects 
Our previous analyses examine the effects on payment practices after the disclosure of payment reports. 
We also examine whether firms changed their behavior following the passage of the regulation but before 
the new rules were implemented (i.e., after the regulation was announced but before any report was 
disclosed). We perform this analysis to help shed light on the mechanism(s) behind our main results. If one 
of the mechanisms through which firms change their behavior is the threat of reputational damage due to 
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poor payment practices, firms may preemptively respond to the implementation of PPDR and adjust 
payment practices prior to the release of payment reports. In contrast, if firms underestimate the level of 
attention and awareness that will be paid to the payment practices reports and anticipate that PPDR will be 
yet another weak attempt by regulators to improve payment behaviors, they will not react before the 
regulation’s implementation.23 
We investigate whether there is a regulation announcement effect by estimating equations (1) and 
(2) excluding firm-year observations after 2017 (i.e., when the regulation came into effect), applying the 
regulatory asset and revenue thresholds to firms in 2015 to identify the covered firms, and substituting the 
variable 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 with 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒, which takes the value of 1 beginning in March 2015 (the month when 
the initial announcement of the regulation was made), and 0 otherwise. Table 3 reports the results. The 
economically and statistically insignificant coefficient estimates for 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 in columns 1 and 2 
indicate that A/P did not change for large firms after the announcement of the PPDR or for large firms with 
high U.K. operations. Similarly, the coefficients reported in columns 3 and 4 indicate that there was no 
significant decrease in A/R for small firms in the full sample or in the subsample of HighUK firms. 
These results suggest that firms likely underestimated the attention that would be paid to payment 
practices reports, resulting in no detectable behavioral changes in the period following the regulation’s 
announcement but before the regulation actually came into effect. Our results also point to the importance 
of the new disclosures, which allowed the public, customers, regulators and suppliers – armed with new 
information – to pressure firms to improve their behavior.24 
                                                          
23 This expectation by firms would be rational given that previous endeavors by the U.K. Government (or its affiliates) 
to improve payment practices failed to produce the desired effects (see section 2 for more background). In addition, 
our conversations with U.K. executives suggest that firms did not anticipate significant attention to be paid to PPDR 
or the released reports. 
24 There is anecdotal evidence to support this. For instance, in April 2019, the U.K. Government announced that 
companies reporting poor payment practices risk exclusion from bidding on public contracts worth £5m or more per 
annum (Financial Times, 2019). Moreover, in July 2019, the U.K.’s Chartered Institute of Credit Management used 
the payment report data to suspend 18 companies from the Prompt Payment Code (Wall Street Journal, 2019). 
Although these actions occur after our sample period ends, it is reasonable to assume that they resulted from public 
pressure, negative attention, and increased awareness of poor payment practices following the release of the reports.  
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4.5. Cross-Sectional Analyses 
Our main results indicate that PPDR led to a reduction in A/P and A/R for large and small firms, 
respectively. In this section, we describe the implementation and results of cross-sectional analyses. For 
large firms, our cross-sectional tests aim to uncover the mechanisms and channels through which PPDR 
generates behavioral changes relating to payment practices, and for small firms, our cross-sectional tests 
explore where the benefits of the regulation are concentrated. 
4.5.1. Cross-sectional analyses for large firms 
Disclosing firms may change their behavior to avoid a backlash from customers and the public against the 
firm or its products (e.g., Graham et al. 2013, Dyreng et al. 2015). Although we do not find that firms 
preemptively react to the threat of shaming and reputational damage by changing their behaviors prior to 
the release of the payment practices reports, firms may have underestimated the public’s response to PPDR. 
Therefore, if payment disclosures discipline firms through increased susceptibility to reputational damage, 
the observed payment behaviors should be stronger for firms with higher expected reputational costs. To 
test this channel, we examine whether the decrease in A/P for large firms is accentuated for firms that sell 
their products to end-customers (i.e., business-to-consumer firms, or B2C) and for firms that receive more 
media attention. We expect reputational costs to be higher if end-consumers purchase from firms directly 
because they can punish firms by not purchasing their products. Moreover, we expect higher reputational 
costs for firms that receive more media attention because of greater societal and public pressure resulting 
from this media coverage.  
Our proxy for B2C is whether the firm is a retailer because retailers directly interact with a large 
number of final customers compared to firms that only transact with other businesses (i.e., business-to-
business firms, or B2B). Therefore, to the extent that consumer pressure increases firms’ expected 
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reputational costs, we expect retailers to reduce their A/P more than B2B firms.25 We create an indicator 
variable, Retail, equal to 1 if the firm is in the retail, internet/e-commerce, auto, hotel, airline or casino 
sectors, and 0 otherwise. We estimate a variation of equation (1) where the variable of interest is 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 ×
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, which estimates the effect of PPDR on A/P for affected (i.e., large) U.K. firms that are 
retailers. The results are presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. In column 1, which uses our full sample, 
we find an insignificant coefficient on the triple interaction term (coef. = 1.067, std. error = 1.982). In 
Column 2, which uses the subsample of HighUK firms, we report a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient (at the 5% level) on the triple interaction term (coef. = -0.146, std. error = 0.058).  
To measure media attention, we count the annual number of unique, English newspaper mentions 
that each firm receives in the business press based on press coverage data collected from Factiva. We 
classify firms as High Media if their media coverage exceeds the median of all sample firms in the year. 
Similar to our retail tests, we estimate a variation of equation for large firms (1) using 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ×
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 as our main independent variable. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 report the results. We find a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on the triple interaction term for the full sample (coef. = -
0.791, std. error = 0.102) and the HighUK sample (coef. = -0.536, std. error = 0.103).   
Overall, the findings across our two measures suggest that increased expected reputational costs, 
measured by firms that sell to end-consumers and firms that receive high media attention, played an 
important role in leading large firms with significant U.K. operations to improve their payment practices in 
response to PPDR. As mentioned above, given that we do not document an effect in the announcement 
period prior to the passage of the regulation, our findings suggest that firms did respond to public attention 
and scrutiny to payment practices but underestimated the public’s response to PPDR. 
4.5.2. Cross-sectional analyses for SMEs 
                                                          
25 Please note that we only perform this test on large firms. We do not expect any changes in A/R for small retailers, 
as they receive their payments directly from retail customers. 
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In our cross-sectional tests for small firms, we are interested in identifying where the benefits of the 
regulation accrue, in terms of faster collection of payment from customers. In contrast to large firms covered 
by PPDR, SMEs are not subject to disclosure requirements but receive new information from large firms 
about their on-average payment practices. We examine which firms are able to use this new information to 
renegotiate improved terms with their customers and whether this aligns with the regulators’ intended 
beneficiaries. 
 First, we examine whether the effect of PPDR on SMEs depends on their competitive position. On 
the one hand, regulators refer to small suppliers with weak negotiating positions as PPDR’s intended 
beneficiaries (DBEIS, 2018). Thus, it is possible that SMEs with weaker competitive positions will have 
greater regulatory support to challenge their large customers and obtain improved payment terms, which 
will allow them to capture greater benefits from the regulation in terms of a larger decline in A/R. 
Conversely, strong relative competitive positions may allow small suppliers to benefit more from PPDR. 
Under this alternative, once SMEs are armed with newly-available information from the payment practices 
reports, they can more effectively leverage their strong competitive positions to renegotiate favorable 
payment terms, while their peers in weaker competitive positions may still be unwilling to challenge their 
large customers. 
 We estimate a variation of equation (2) where the variable of interest is 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ×
𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼, which estimates the effect of PPDR on A/R for small U.K. firms that have strong 
competitive positions, as measured by their asset intensity.26 The results are presented in columns 1 and 2 
of Table 5. In column 1, which uses our full sample, we show a negative and significant coefficient (at the 
1% level) on the triple interaction term (coef. = -0.0011, std. error = 0.0001). In column 2, which uses the 
subsample of HighUK firms, we document a negative and statistically significant coefficient (at the 5% 
level) on the triple interaction term (coef. = -0.0002, std. error = 0.00008). This suggests that once SMEs 
                                                          
26 We measure asset intensity as the ratio of assets to revenues in the year 2015. We choose 2015 as the benchmark 
year because the regulation was announced in 2015. Our results are qualitatively the same if we use the average of 
cash intensities over multiple years around the announcement of the regulation. 
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with relatively high negotiating power are equipped with information from the payment practices reports, 
they are able to obtain better payment terms. 
The regulation was also intended to benefit cash-constrained firms that could become financially 
distressed from late payments. As the regulatory guidance states, “Late payment is a key issue for smaller 
businesses as it can adversely affect their cash flow and jeopardize their ability to trade. In the worst case, 
late payment can lead to insolvency” (DBEIS, 2017, p. 3). We examine whether, as the regulation intended, 
the benefits of PPDR accrued to cash-constrained firms. The results for cash-constrained firms are reported 
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. The variable of interest, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃ℎ 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼, estimates the 
effect of PPDR on A/R for small U.K. firms as a function of cash intensity, measured as the ratio of cash to 
total assets.27 The coefficient on the triple interaction term is negative but insignificant for the full sample 
in column 3 (coef. = -0.472, std. error = 0.329) and is negative and statistically significant (at the 1% level) 
for the subsample of High UK firms in column 4 (coef. = -0.1232, std. error = 0.0334). This finding indicates 
that firms with higher cash intensity benefitted more from the regulation. Although this is not in-line with 
PPDR’s objective, our interpretation is that SMEs with greater financial resources were able to obtain 
improved payment terms due to the threat of walking away from a large customer, the threat of pursuing 
legal action for late payment, or the threat of publicizing unfair payment terms. Although SMEs with 
reduced financial constraints could threaten to do all of these things before PPDR, the credibility of these 
threats increased following PPDR because SMEs could use information from the payment records in 
negative publicity efforts and in legal actions, in addition to having increased regulatory support for fair 
payment. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such threats did, in fact, materialize. For instance, following 
PPDR, the Office of the Small Business Commissioner (SBC) experienced an increase in the number of 
late payment cases brought to their attention from small companies who, in the past, were reluctant to 
                                                          
27 As in the case of asset intensity, we calculate cash intensity as the ratio of cash balance to assets in the year 2015 – 
the year when the regulation was announced. Our results are qualitatively the same if we use the average of cash 
intensities over multiple years around the announcement of the regulation. 
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challenge their large customers (The Guardian, 2019).28 In addition, the U.K. Chartered Institute of Credit 
Management suspended 18 companies from the Prompt Payment Code following complaints from their 
suppliers – and data from the payment reports to support their complaints – that they were not compliant 
with the Code (Wall Street Journal, 2019). 
4.6.  Effects on Economic Efficiency 
An important motivation for improving payment practices is economic efficiency. In a research report 
related to PPDR, the U.K. Government stated that “…Late payment [has] significant consequences for 
companies and the economy. It directly creates administrative costs for creditors and cash flow issues, and 
can indirectly lead to income loss, hindered growth and inability to pay or hire employees.” (DBEIS, 2018, 
p. 16). A key issue that arises when large firms delay payment to small suppliers, is that small suppliers are 
forced to issue short-term debt to finance working capital (DBEIS, 2018). Given that the operations of large, 
mature companies are generally more stable than those of small firms, large firms likely face a lower cost 
of capital and it may not be efficient for small firms to finance large firms.  In addition, when small firms 
are not paid on time, their growth is hindered because they lack the resources to invest (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt 2006). This prevents small firms from bidding on larger contracts that could contribute to their growth, 
as they are unable to demonstrate a capacity to fulfill awarded contracts. In this section, we examine whether 
PPDR resulted in improvements in economic efficiency along two key dimensions: short-term debt and the 
value of contracts awarded to SMEs.  
 To estimate the effect of PPDR on short-term debt of SMEs, we estimate our difference-in-
differences model using short-term debt scaled by assets, STD, as the dependent variable. Table 6 reports 
the results. Columns 1 and 4 presents the coefficient estimates for the full and the High UK samples, 
respectively. Consistent with a reduction in short-term debt, we find that SMEs experienced a statistically 
significant (at the 5% level) reduction in STD of 3.3% to 3.7% relative to large firms. To understand whether 
                                                          
28 Since PPDR, the SBC has mediated thousands of late payment cases and has helped resolve payment disputes worth 
£400,000 with larger businesses (The Guardian, 2019).  
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this effect is driven by a reduction in STD for small firms, an increase in STD for large firms, or a 
combination of both, we also estimate single difference models for small and large firms separately. 
Columns 2 and 3 report the results for the full sample, while columns 5 and 6 report the results for the High 
UK sample. We do not find a statistically nor economically significant change in STD for large firms. 
However, we find that SMEs decreased STD by approximately 3.6%, indicating that the majority of the 
diff-in-diff estimate reported in columns 1 and 4 is due to lower short-term financing by SMEs.  
 To estimate the effect of PPDR on the value of contracts awarded to SMEs, we use publicly 
available contract data between U.K. Government agencies and their suppliers. Ideally, we would like to 
examine whether PPDR affects the contracts between U.K. suppliers and all of their customers, but this 
data is not available. Therefore, we utilize data on U.K. public sector contracts between January 1, 2015 
and September 30, 2019, accessed from https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder. Since 2015, U.K. government 
agencies must publish procurement opportunities and contracts awarded (over £10,000) on Contracts 
Finder, a website administered by the Government. 
The U.K. Government contract data provides information on the agency that awarded the contract, 
the contract description, the contract value, the date that the contract was awarded, and the name and contact 
information of the supplier that was awarded the contract. In some cases, there is information on the 
estimated start and end dates of the contract. There is also a field indicating whether a SME was granted 
the contract. First, we examine whether, following PPDR, SMEs are awarded larger, or higher-value, 
contracts from U.K. Government agencies. Our conjecture is that, if PPDR results in improved payment 
practices, smaller suppliers will be more willing to bid-on, and be able to demonstrate their capacity to 
fulfill, larger contracts. With more on-time payments from their customers, SMEs can more readily invest 
in the tangible and intangible assets needed to deliver on, and show suitability for, larger contracts.  
To estimate the effect of PPDR on the contracts awarded to SMEs, we estimate our difference-in-
differences model using the natural logarithm of contract value (ContractValue) as the dependent variable. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results. Consistent with larger contracts being awarded to SMEs in the post-
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PPDR period, we find that SMEs experienced a statistically significant (at the 1% level) increase in 
ContractValue of 4.5% relative to large firms. This result is robust to the inclusion of U.K. Government 
agency fixed effects, supplier fixed effects and year fixed effects. To understand whether this effect is 
driven by an increase in ContractValue for SMEs, a decrease in ContractValue for large firms, or a 
combination of both, we estimate single difference models for SMEs and large firms separately. We do not 
find a statistically nor economically significant change in ContractValue for large firms (Column 2). 
However, in Column 3, we find that SMEs increased ContractValue by approximately 5.9%, indicating 
that the majority of the diff-in-diff estimate reported in Column 1 is due to larger contracts being awarded 
to SMEs following PPDR.   
  Our analysis suggests that SMEs are awarded larger contracts following PPDR relative to large 
firms. However, this could be due to increased contract opportunities for SMEs in the post-PPDR period 
(i.e. a demand-side effect) rather than SMEs becoming more competitive for larger contracts in the post-
PPDR period (i.e. a supply-side effect). To disentangle whether the effect is due to demand or supply 
shocks, we examine whether the U.K. Government increased contract opportunities for SMEs in the post-
PPDR period. As our dependent variable, we use an indicator, SME_Eligible, that is equal to one if the U.K. 
Government agency awarding the contract will consider bids from SMEs, and 0 otherwise. 
Column 4 in Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of estimating a single difference model for the 
sample of contracts that are SME-eligible. We do not find a statistically nor economically significant change 
in SME_Eligible in the post-period. This suggests that the increase in contract value awarded to SMEs was 
not driven by an increase in the Government’s demand for SME suppliers. Nevertheless, we cannot rule-
out the possibility that the U.K. Government favors smaller suppliers in the post-PPDR period. However, 
procurement rules in the U.K. have certain controls in place to promote fair procurement practices, such as 
pre-qualification questionnaires which require buyers to evaluate potential suppliers on particular criteria 
and demonstrate that the criteria have been met before accepting a bid. 
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Overall, the results in this section suggest that PPDR lead to increases in economic efficiency via 
reduced short-term debt for smaller firms and larger government contracts being awarded to smaller firms, 
the latter of which could potentially contribute to their future growth.  
5. Analysis of Payment Practices Disclosures 
Our analyses thus far have focused on financial statement-based data and contract-level data to analyze the 
effects of PPDR. In this section, we utilize firm disclosures provided in the newly-mandated payment 
practices reports to provide a more nuanced understanding of how firms change their payment practices 
following PPDR. 
 PPDR requires affected firms to disclose their payment practices on a semiannual basis, within 30 
days of their usual semiannual year-end date. The earliest mandated reports were for firms with an April 
year-end date; their first semiannual reports were due by November 30, 2017 and became immediately 
available on the regulator’s website.29 Required disclosures include statistics, narrative information and 
check-the-box statements (see section 2 for more information). Given that we do not have pre-PPDR 
disclosures, our tests are limited to an examination of whether and how firms’ payment practices change 
from one report to the next. 
5.1. Summary Statistics 
As of June 2019, there were 14,268 reports available. Panel A of Table 7 presents summary statistics for 
the relevant numerical disclosures provided in the full set of reports. On average, the payment time for an 
invoice is 37 days; 53.5% of invoices are paid within 30 days, 14.6% are paid between 31 and 60 days, and 
31.8% are paid in more than 60 days. Interestingly, more than 30% of invoices are not paid within the 
agreed terms. The regulator requires that these calculations be made based on the number of invoices and 
not their nominal balance. In Panel B, we provide statistics for the reports from High UK firms to facilitate 
                                                          
29 The first report for firms with a December 31, 2017 year-end was July 30, 2018. The schedule of first-year reports 
is on page 20 of the Guidance document: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.U.K./government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/649941/payment-practices-performance-reporting-requirements-oct-2017.pdf) 
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the interpretation of our later results; there are no notable differences between these statistics for the full 
sample compared to the subsample. 
5.2. Results 
Our specification for the analysis of payment practices reports is as follows: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖, (3) 
where the dependent variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 represents one of the numerical variables constructed using the disclosure 
reports, 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 takes a value between 1 and 4, depending on whether the metrics refer to the 
first, second, third or fourth report, and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 denotes firm fixed effects.30 We cluster standard errors at the 
firm level. Notably, unlike the previous set of analyses using financial statement data, in this analysis, we 
cannot run a difference-in-differences specification because we do not have payment terms data for SMEs. 
Therefore, the interpretation of results here is different from the previous analysis, where we could speak 
to the causal effect of the regulation on the payment terms of disclosing firms. In this setting, we can only 
report the within-firm time trend in payment practices for disclosing firms. 
We expect that it takes time for consumers, the public, regulators, and the media to interpret and 
analyze the disclosures and exert pressure on firms to change their behavior. Similarly, we anticipate that 
renegotiations between customers and suppliers are time-consuming. Consequently, our specification 
explicitly models the expectation that changes to payment practices can occur over time. Table 8 reports 
the results of estimating this model. Panel A reports results for the full sample of reports, and Panel B 
reports results for the subsample of reports from High UK firms. In column 1 of Panel A, the coefficient on 
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 is -1.543 (significant at the 1% level), indicating that with each report, firms reduce the 
fraction of invoices not paid within the contractually agreed time by 1.5%. Given that the mean fraction of 
invoices not paid as agreed is approximately 31%, this reduction is economically significant and suggests 
                                                          
30 As of August 2019, the maximum number of reports available per firm was 4. 
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that firms reduce this fraction to 26% (on average after three reports). Moreover, the coefficient in column 
1 of Panel B for the subsample of High UK firms is 2.5 times larger (coef. = -3.95, std. error = 0.602), 
implying that firms reduce the fraction of invoices not paid within the agreed time from 31% to 18% after 
three reporting periods. 
It is possible that the reason for the reduction in the fraction of invoices not paid in agreed terms is 
simply because they increased the length of the contractual period in which they could make a payment. In 
column 2, we explore whether this is the case. We find that the standard contractual payment period actually 
decreases in both the full and the High UK samples. In addition, the coefficient on 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 in 
column 3 shows that the average payment time is unchanged in the full sample but decreases by 3.7 days 
per report for the High UK firms. The dependent variables in columns 3 to 5 measure the fraction of invoices 
paid within 30 days, between 31 and 60 days, and over 60 days, respectively. In Panel A, the coefficients 
on 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 from these models reveal a shift in payment practices. In particular, with each report, 
firms accelerate payment of 0.8% of their invoices, so that they are within 30 days instead of between 31 
and 60 days. We document similar but economically larger results in Panel B for the subset of High UK 
firms. Our estimates suggest that High UK firms accelerated payment of 4% of their invoices to within 30 
days, while reducing the fraction of invoices paid between 31-60 days and over 60 days by 2.2% and 1.7%, 
respectively. 
The results of this test are consistent with large firms gradually continuing to improve their behavior 
after the implementation of the regulation. However, it is important to note that we are unable to disentangle 
whether this gradual effect is due to more data becoming available over time or simply due to the passage 
of time since each firm released its first report. This difficulty arises because supplier-customer negotiations 
are unobservable and because negotiating better terms is likely a time-consuming process. 
6. Robustness Tests 
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An alternative interpretation of our main findings is that the change in accounts payable and accounts 
receivable is driven by a general time trend unrelated to the disclosure of payment practices. Although this 
is unlikely, given the reasons motivating the introduction of this policy, we run three additional tests. 
Specifically, we examine the validity of our parallel trend assumption for the difference-in-differences 
analyses and conduct two falsification tests. 
6.1. Parallel Trends 
A concern with using a difference-in-differences methodology arises if the treatment and control group are 
subject to different trends prior to the treatment event. We examine the validity of the parallel trend 
assumption in our setting by estimating a variation of equation (1) that includes the interaction of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 or 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 with a year indicator variable for each of the years 2009 to 2015. As shown in Table 9, we do not find 
statistically significant differences between large and small firms in the pretreatment period in the full or 
the High UK samples. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of these findings. If the effect were 
driven by the differences between large and small firms and not by the disclosure mandated by the 
regulation, then we would expect to see effects in the preperiods. Thus, the lack of statistically significant 
coefficients in Table 8 further rules out the explanation that our results are being driven by the differential 
trends in the AP and AR ratios for large and small firms, respectively, rather than the regulation. 
6.2. Falsification Tests 
Our first falsification test assumes that the regulation came into effect in April of each of the years from 
2011 to 2015, instead of its actual implementation date in April 2017. In each of the placebo years, we use 
the asset and revenue cutoffs specified by the regulation to classify firms into treatment and control groups. 
To remove the actual impact of the regulation, we remove observations from the years 2017 and 2018, as 
the regulation had already taken effect in those years. We then estimate regression (1) and report the results 
in Panel A of Table 10. As shown in the table, we do not find an economically or statistically significant 
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effect in each of the placebo years. The results from this test rule out that the change in firms’ payment 
behavior was due to an event prior to the actual implementation of the regulation. 
 Second, having established that the effects were due to an event in 2017, a remaining concern is 
whether there was a concurrent event unrelated to the disclosure requirements. To rule out this possibility, 
we exploit the arbitrary size thresholds set by the policy. If the PPDR is driving our results, we expect that 
if 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 are defined using other arbitrary thresholds, the effects will weaken or disappear. 
 To conduct this falsification test, we create placebo cutoff points. In columns 1 to 4 of Panel B, we 
remove firms in a £50 m asset-and-revenue band around the regulatory thresholds.31 We then define a 
treatment effect around a placebo cutoff of £100 m above the actual regulatory cutoffs (i.e., £136 m for 
revenues and £118 m for assets). The results reported in the first four columns of Table 10 show no 
treatment effect around this placebo cutoff. In columns 5 to 8, we repeat the same exercise while changing 
the placebo cutoff to £200 m above the actual regulatory cutoffs. At this placebo cutoff, for “large” firms, 
we do find a statistically significant increase in A/P. This suggests, that these placebo large firms actually 
increase their A/P relative to the placebo small firms. Finally, in columns 9 to 12, we remove firms in a 
£100 m asset-and-revenue band around the regulatory thresholds and define the placebo cutoff as £200 m 
above the actual regulatory cutoffs. We do not find a treatment effect under this placebo cutoff. These tests 
help mitigate the concern that a different event in 2017 drives our results. In addition, the lack of a 
significant decrease in A/R for placebo SME firms in Table 10 also highlights that firms strategically comply 
with the regulation by paying off smaller suppliers and not the larger ones. Taken together, the results from 
the falsification tests further confirm that our results are driven by the PPDR. 
7. Conclusions 
                                                          
31 The regulatory cutoff is £18m for assets and £36m for revenue. Therefore, in this placebo test, all the true control 
firms are dropped. From the sample of true treated firms, we drop all firms with revenues below £86m and assets 
below £68m. In un-tabulated results we find that results are consistent if we drop only the true control firms 
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This paper examines whether transparency about payment practices affects supplier-customer contracts. 
We exploit the introduction of PPDR, a regulation in the U.K. requiring large firms to disclose several 
metrics detailing how they pay their suppliers. Using this setting, we show that large firms significantly 
reduce their accounts payable after the introduction of PPDR. In addition, we investigate whether the 
intended beneficiaries of the increased disclosure, SMEs, indeed benefit from the regulation. Consistent 
with the objective of the regulators, we find that PPDR led to a significant reduction of 11.3% in A/R for 
SMEs with large exposure to the U.K. We find that the effect on large firms is more pronounced for retailers 
and for firms with high media coverage, suggesting that higher expected reputational costs is an important 
mechanism driving the change in payment behavior of large firms. In addition, we show that the effects for 
SMEs are concentrated in firms with stronger competitive positions. We also document that PPDR lead to 
increases in economic efficiency via reduced short-term debt for SMEs, and larger government contracts 
being awarded to SMEs, potentially contributing to their future growth. 
Our analyses of the newly-mandated disclosure reports indicate that changes in payment practices occur 
gradually over time. We find that with each additional report issued, the fraction of invoices not paid within 
the agreed terms decreases by 1.5%, an economically meaningful magnitude. In addition, we document a 
significant increase in the fraction of invoices paid within 30 days. Taken together, our evidence indicates 
that disclosure regulation can be an effective tool to improve payment terms for small suppliers. 
Our study contributes to both the disclosure and trade credit literature. Prior work shows that trade 
credit is one of the main sources of financing for companies and is typically beset by inefficiencies. By 
studying the effects of disclosure on payment practices, we show that transparency in this area can 
significantly shift bargaining power across customers and suppliers. These findings have important 
implications for academics who want to better understand the benefits of disclosure for non-disclosing 
parties and for regulators around the world concerned with improving payment practices. 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
The following variables are constructed using data from Bloomberg [B], Worldscope [WS], regulatory 
filings available as of August, 2019 [RF], Factiva [F] and Contract Finder [CF]. 
 
 
a We winsorize accounts payable, accounts receivable, and revenues at the 1% and the 99% levels before calculating these ratios 
Variable Definition 
A/P Accounts payable as a ratio of revenues.a [B] 
A/R Accounts receivables as a ratio of revenues.a [B] 
STD 
Large 
Short-term debt as ratio of assets.a [B] 
Indicator variable for large firms as determined by the size thresholds set 
by PPDR.  [B] 
Post Indicator variable for time periods after PPDR comes into effect 
(November 2017). 
SME Indicator variable for small and medium-sized enterprises as determined 
by the size thresholds set by PPDR. [B] 
HighMedia Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s annual media coverage, 
captured by the number of unique English newspaper mentions in the 
business press, exceeds the median of all sample firms in the year. [F] 
HighUK Indicator variable for firms whose fraction of revenues originating in the 
U.K. is greater than 33%. [WS] 
Post_Announce Indicator variable for the time period after PPDR is announced (March 
2015) till its implementation (October 2017). 
Retail Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the retail, internet/e-
commerce, autos, hotels, airlines or casino sectors, and 0 otherwise. [B] 
Asset Intensive Assets as a ratio of revenue. [B] 
Cash Intensity Cash as a ratio of assets. [B] 
Short Term Leverage 
ContractValue 
 
SME_Eligible 
Short term debt as a ratio of assets. [B] 
Natural logarithm of one plus the contract value awarded to a supplier 
from a U.K. Government agency. [CF] 
Indicator variable for contracts that are eligible for bidding by SMEs. 
[CF] 
InvoicesNotPaidinAgreedTerm Percentage of invoices not paid within agreed terms. [RF] 
Avg_Pmt Average time taken to pay an invoice. [RF] 
Frac_30 Percentage of invoices paid within 30 days. [RF] 
31_Frac_60 Percentage of invoices paid in more than 30 days but less than 60 days. 
[RF] 
Frac_60+ Percentage of invoices paid in more than 60 days. [RF] 
ShortestOrOnlyStandardPaymentperiod 
 
Report_Number 
Number of days to make payments, as set out in the standard payment 
terms. [RF] 
Count variable. Equals n for the 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡ℎ report filed by a firm. [RF] 
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Figure 1. Parallel Trends 
The following graphs reports the estimation results from a linear regressions of the following form: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁_𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝛴𝛴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁_𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖. 
We analyze the differential time trends in the treatment and control groups by decomposing Firm_Type x 
Post term into mutually exclusive, Firm_Type x Year indicators for each of the years in the sample. The 
dependent variable is A/P for large firms and A/R for SMEs. Panels A and B report coefficients for the 
Firm_Type x Year indicators for large firms and SMEs with high exposure to the U.K, respectively. All 
models include firm and time fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A, and the sample spans 
the period 2009-2018. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the 
coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A. Large High UK Firms 
 
Panel B. High UK SMEs 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This Table presents the summary statistics for the firm-year observations in our sample. Panel A presents statistics for the full sample of firms. Panel 
B presents statistics for the sample of firms whose operations are highly exposed to the U.K. 
Panel A. Full Sample 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th N Mean (Large) Mean(SME) 
Payables 55,000,000 156,000,000 604,683 2,800,000 22,000,000 12,470  105,000,000   1,519,165  
Receivables 58,700,000 148,000,000 1,000,000 4,400,000 32,000,000 11,861  108,000,000   1,911,466  
Revenue 621,000,000 1,700,000,000 8,800,000 43,000,000 270,000,000 12,709 1,200,000,000  10,800,000  
Assets 740,000,000 2,000,000,000 9,300,000 43,000,000 290,000,000 12,852 1,410,000,000    34,100,000  
Short-term Debt 34,300,000 120,000,000 4,000 726,161 7,400,000 11,054  62,900,000   2,231,572  
A/P 0.56 9.36 0.05 0.08 0.13 11,694  0.11   1.10  
A/R 0.23 2.26 0.06 0.13 0.19 11,373 0.13 0.34 
  Short-term Debt/Asset 0.07 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.07 11,054 0.05 0.09 
Large 0.50 0.50 0.00 1 1 14,190 1 0 
HighUKOps 0.50 0.50 0.00 0 1 12,871 0.45 0.55 
FracUKRev 0.34 0.27 0.15 0.33 0.61 12,871 0.31 0.37 
 
Panel B. High UK Sample 
Variable Mean Std. 25th Median 75th N Mean (Large) Mean (SME) 
Payables 47,300,000 139,000,000 734,000 3,300,000 20,000,000 5,355  85,900,000   1,253,296  
Receivables 52,200,000 134,000,000 1,200,000 4,500,000 28,000,000 5,293  93,700,000   1,796,646  
Revenue 517,000,000 1,410,000,000 10,000,000 56,000,000 240,000,000 5,412  946,000,000   11,900,000  
Assets 566,000,000 1,620,000,000 9,800,000 42,000,000 220,000,000 5,481 1,040,000,000   20,100,000  
Short-term Debt 24,800,000 92,900,000 17,321 810,000 6,700,000 4,559  43,800,000   1,286,232  
A/P 0.41 8.57 0.05 0.08 0.13 5,304  0.10   0.51  
A/R 0.16 0.31 0.07 0.14 0.19 5,213 0.13 0.19 
Short-term Debt/Asset 0.07 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.07 4,559 0.11 0.09 
FracUKRev 0.55 0.23 0.35 0.53 0.74 6,436 0.42 0.57 
35 
 
Table 2. Difference-in-differences  
This table reports the estimation results from a linear regressions of the following form: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁_𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁_𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖. 
The dependent variable is A/P when the analysis relates to large firms and A/R when the analysis relates to 
SMEs. Columns 1 and 2 report results for large firms for the full sample and the subsample of firms with 
high exposure to the U.K., respectively.  Columns 3 and 4 report results for SMEs for the full sample and 
the subsample of firms with high exposure to the U.K., respectively. All models include firm and time fixed 
effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A, and the sample spans the period 2009-2018. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Sample: All Firms High UK  All Firms High UK  
Dep. Variable: A/P A/P A/R A/R 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) 
     
Large x Post -0.964 -0.1273**   
 (1.677) (0.0569)   
SME x Post   -0.199** -0.1128*** 
   (0.0984) (0.0205) 
     
Post 0.322 -0.0988 0.104 0.0378 
 (1.378) (0.0607) (0.0688) (0.0412) 
     
Constant 0.388*** 0.188*** 0.160*** 0.165*** 
 (0.121) (0.0177) (0.0419) (0.0120) 
     
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,694 5,304 11,373 5,264 
R-squared 0.215 0.331 0.184 0.229 
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Table 3. Announcement Effect Analysis 
This table reports the estimation results from a linear regressions of the following form:                  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0  + 𝛼𝛼1𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁_𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁_𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖. 
The dependent variable is A/P when the analysis relates to large firms and A/R when the analysis relates to 
SMEs. Columns 1 and 2 report results for large firms for the full sample and the subsample of firms with 
high exposure to the U.K., respectively.  Columns 3 and 4 report results for SMEs for the full sample and 
the subsample of firms with high exposure to the U.K., respectively. All models include firm and time fixed 
effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A, and the sample spans the period 2009 – October 2017. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Sample: All Firms High UK  All Firms High UK  
Dep. Variable: A/P A/P A/R A/R 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) 
     
Large x Post_ Announce -0.360 -0.0041     
 (0.406) (0.0223)     
SME x Post_ Announce     -0.0780 0.00051 
     (0.128) (0.0306) 
     
Post_Announce 0.137 0.0076 0.0129 0.0071 
 (0.244) (0.0289) (0.0260) (0.0221) 
     
Constant 0.311*** 0.1651*** 0.161*** 0.165*** 
 (0.129) (0.0127) (0.0448) (0.0127) 
     
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,527 4,655 10,210 4,655 
R-squared 0.281 0.2407 0.199 0.24 
 
37 
 
Table 4. Cross-sectional Analysis: Large Firms 
This table analyzes cross-sectional variation in the results related to large firms presented in Table 2. 
Columns 1 and 2 estimates the effects separately for retail firms as defined in Appendix A in the full and 
High UK samples respectively. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the model using cross-sectional variation in 
media and business press coverage in the full and High UK samples respectively. All models include firm 
and time fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A, and the sample spans the period 2009-
2018. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Sample: All Firms High UK  All Firms High UK  
Dep. Variable: A/P A/P A/P A/P 
Firm Characteristic: Retail Retail High Media 
Attention 
 High Media 
Attention 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) 
     
Large x Firm Char. x Post 1.0667 -0.1462** -0.7910***  -0.5357*** 
 (1.982) (0.0584) (0.1019) (0.1029) 
     
Firm Char. x Post -1.0747 0.1512*** 0.7269*** 0.4794*** 
 (1.982) (0.0578) (0.1010) (0.1030) 
     
Large x Post -0.970 0.1272** 0.3595*** 0.3009*** 
 (1.681) (0.0574) (0.0532) (0.0681) 
     
Post 0.328 -0.0993 -0.3414*** -0.2305*** 
 (1.386) (0.0609) (0.0551) (0.0655) 
     
Constant 0.388*** 0.188*** 0.1847*** 0.1881*** 
 (0.121) (0.0178) (0.0135) (0.0176) 
     
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,694 5,304 11,694 5,304 
R-squared 0.215 0. 2583 0.611 0.4823 
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Table 5. Cross-sectional Analysis: Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) 
This table analyzes cross-sectional variation in the results related to SMEs presented in Table 2. Columns 
1 and 2 estimate the model using cross-sectional variation in asset intensity in the full and High UK samples 
respectively. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the model using cross-sectional variation in cash intensity in the 
full and High UK samples respectively. All models include firm and time fixed effects. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A, and the sample spans the period 2009-2018. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level and are reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the two-
tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Sample: All Firms High UK  All Firms High UK  
Dep. Variable: A/R A/R A/R A/R 
Firm Characteristic: Asset Intensity Asset Intensity Cash Intensity Cash Intensity 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) 
     
SME x Firm Char. x Post -0.00109*** -0.0002** -0.472 -0.1232*** 
 (0.000129) (0.00008) (0.329) (0.03344) 
     
Firm Char. x Post 0.00001 0.00002* 0.0221 0.03283 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.0270) (0.0263) 
     
SME x Post -0.150 -0.09273 -0.0834 0.02382 
 (0.0992) (0.0969) (0.0728) (0.0772) 
     
Post 0.0845 0.0224 0.103 0.03449** 
 (0.0693) (0.0376) (0.0701) (0.01478) 
     
Constant 0.154*** 0.168*** 0.160*** 0.165*** 
 (0.0425) (0.0108) (0.0425) (0.0122) 
     
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,221 5,223 11,243 5,195 
R-squared 0.182 0.38 0.184 0.227 
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Table 6. Economic Efficiency 
The main results in this table report the estimation results from a linear regressions of the following form: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁_𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁_𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖. 
Panel A. Short-term debt 
The dependent variable is STD for all firms. Columns 1 and 4 report results for large firms for the full 
sample and the subsample of firms with high exposure to the U.K., respectively.  Columns 2 and 3 report 
results for change in STD between the pre and post periods for all large firms and SMEs, respectively. 
Columns 5 and 6 report results for change in STD between the pre and post periods for High UK large firms 
and SMEs, respectively.  Columns 1 and 4 include firm and time fixed effects. Columns 2,3,5 and 6 include 
firm fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A, and the sample spans the period 2009-2018. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Sample: All Firms All Firms: Large  
All Firms: 
SME 
High UK  High UK: 
Large 
High UK: 
SME 
Dep. Variable: STD STD STD STD STD STD 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
       
SME x Post -0.033**   -0.037**   
 (0.016)   (0.016)   
       
Post 0.003 -0.005 -0.037** 0.013 0.000 -0.036** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.016) (0.010) (0.005) (0.015) 
       
Constant 0.084*** 0.052*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.057*** 0.094*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
       
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes No No 
Observations 11,054 5,840 5,214 4,610 2,551 2,059 
R-squared 0.419 0.566 0.395 0.439 0.588 0.309 
 
40 
 
Panel B. Contracts Awarded 
The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 is ContractValue for all firms. The dependent variable in Column 
4 is SME_Eligible.  Columns 2 and 3 report results for change in ContractValue between the pre and post 
periods for large firms and SMEs, respectively. Columns 1 and 4 include firm and time fixed effects. 
Columns 2 and 3 include firm fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A, and the sample 
spans the period 2015-2019. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the 
coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Sample: All Firms Large  SME All Firms  
Dep. Variable: ContractValue ContractValue ContractValue SME_Eligible 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) 
     
SME x Post 0.0452***    
 (0.0118)    
     
Post -0.2344 0.0047 0.0593** 0.0222 
 (0.1755) (0.1900) (0.0253) (0.0333) 
     
Constant 0.2934*** 0.2372*** 0.4923*** 0.6909*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0043) (0.0293) 
     
Supplier Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Gov’t Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes 
Observations 68,920 45,934 22,986 4,610 
R-squared 0.857 0.776 0.767 0.8117 
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Table 7. Summary Statistics - Payment Practices Reports 
This table reports summary statistics on the information reported on the payment practices regulatory 
reports available on https://publish-payment-practices.service.gov.uk  website as of August, 2019. Panel A 
provides summary statistics on the full sample. Panel B provides summary statistics on the subsample of 
firms whose operations are highly exposed to the U.K. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A. Full Regulatory Sample 
 Mean St Dev. 25th Median 75th N 
Avg. Payment Time (days) 37.42 25.13 25 35 46 14,251 
Invoices < 30days (%) 53.58 28.29 29 55 78 14,251 
Invoices > 60days (%) 31.81 20.63 15 30 46 14,251 
31days < Invoices < 60days (%) 14.60 17.00 3 8 19 14,251 
Invoices Not Paid in Agreed Terms (%) 30.75 24.74 10 25 46 14,268 
Standard Payment period (days) 21.62 24.56 1 28 30 14,268 
 
 
Panel B. High UK Regulatory Sample 
 Mean St Dev. 25th Median 75th N 
Avg. Payment Time (days) 40.42 27.6 28 37 49 1,479 
Invoices < 30days (%) 50.56 26.5 29 50 72 1,479 
Invoices > 60days (%) 32.67 18.5 19 32 46 1,479 
31days < Invoices < 60days (%) 16.76 18.3 4 10 23 1,479 
Invoices Not Paid in Agreed Terms (%) 31.21 24.4 12 26 46 1,479 
Standard Payment period (days) 22.23 21 1 28 30 1,479 
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Table 8. Regulatory Results 
This table reports the estimation results from a linear regressions of the following form: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖. 
Panel A reports the results from the full sample and Panel B reports the results for the sample of firms 
whose operations are highly exposed to the U.K. The dependent variables are 
InvoicesNotPaidinAgreedTerm,Shorterst_Std_Period , Avg_Pmt, Frac_30, 31_Frac_60, and Frac_60+, in 
column 1 to 6 respectively. The main explanatory in all models is Report_Number. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. All models include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are 
reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Full Regulatory Sample 
Dep. Variables: InvoicesNot
PaidinAgree
dTerm 
Shorterst_Std
_Period 
Avg_Pmt Frac_30 31_Frac_60 Frac_60+ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Report_number -1.544*** -0.264** 0.00437 0.808*** -0.797*** -0.00567 
 (0.199) (0.124) (0.137) (0.169) (0.147) (0.110) 
       
Constant 33.59*** 21.92*** 37.17*** 52.27*** 33.11*** 14.61*** 
 (0.334) (0.209) (0.230) (0.283) (0.248) (0.185) 
       
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,066 13,066 13,057 13,057 13,057 13,057 
R-squared 0.911 0.951 0.927 0.950 0.925 0.941 
 
Panel B. High UK Regulatory Sample 
Dep. Variables: InvoicesNot
PaidinAgree
dTerm 
Shorterst_Std
_Period 
Avg_Pmt Frac_30 31_Frac_60 Frac_60+ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Report_number -3.958*** -0.0280* -3.733*** 3.954*** -2.228*** -1.716*** 
 (0.6022) (0.0154) (0.4976) (0.5379) (0.4644) (0.3119) 
       
Constant 37.898*** 22.281*** 46.724*** 43.873*** 36.451*** 19.651*** 
 (1.017) (0.5231) (0.8404) (0.9087) (0.784) (0.5267) 
       
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,479 1,479 1,479 1,479 1,479 1,479 
R-squared 0.9061 0.928 0.944 0.942 0.906 0.954 
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Table 9. Parallel Trend Analysis 
This table reports the estimation results from a linear regressions of the following form: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁_𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝛴𝛴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁_𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖. 
We analyze the differential time trends in the treatment and control groups by decomposing Firm_Type x 
Post term into mutually exclusive, Firm_Type x Year indicators for each of the years in the sample. The 
dependent variable is A/P when the analysis relates to large firms and A/R when the analysis relates to 
SMEs. Columns 1 and 2 report results for large firms for the full sample and the subsample of firms with 
high exposure to the U.K., respectively.  Columns 3 and 4 report results for SMEs for the full sample and 
the subsample of firms with high exposure to the U.K., respectively. All models include firm and time fixed 
effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A, and the sample spans the period 2009-2018. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Sample: All firms High U.K. All firms High U.K. 
Firm type: Large Large SME SME 
Dep. Variable: A/P A/P A/R A/R 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Post -0.204 -1.163 0.014 -0.015 
 (0.577) (1.027) (0.040) (0.013) 
Firm type x 2009 0.728 -0.290 -0.196 -0.072 
 (0.586) (0.545) (0.158) (0.074) 
Firm type x 2010 0.783 0.208 -0.082 -0.036 
 (0.726) (0.266) (0.175) (0.062) 
Firm type x 2011 0.542 0.130 -0.127 -0.047 
 (0.563) (0.278) (0.160) (0.070) 
Firm type x 2012 0.968* 0.069 0.0127 -0.005 
 (0.571) (0.282) (0.171) (0.080) 
Firm type x 2013 -0.0407 0.094 0.108 -0.033 
 (0.788) (0.254) (0.177) (0.071) 
Firm type x 2014 0.383 -0.279 0.372 -0.044 
 (0.508) (0.383) (0.443) (0.069) 
Firm type x 2015 0.475 -0.120 -0.042 -0.045 
 (0.469) (0.1258) (0.114) (0.060) 
Firm type x 2017 -0.0809 -1.225** -0.126 -0.011 
 (0.810) (0.531) (0.123) (0.066) 
Firm type x 2018 -1.006 -0.597** -0.234 -0.157** 
 (2.466) (0.286) (0.149) (0.078) 
     
Constant -0.0115 0.522 0.246*** 0.197*** 
 (0.419) (0.500) (0.0619) (0.033) 
     
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,694 5,304 11,373 5,264 
R-squared 0.216 0.159 0.185 0.229 
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Table 10. Falsification Tests 
Panel A. Placebo Years 
In the models below we report the results of placebo versions of our main analysis. We create treatment and control groups in each of the placebo 
years by applying regulatory asset and revenue cutoffs in those years. We limit the post period in each of the models to the year subsequent to the 
placebo treatment year to mimic our main analysis. The dependent variable is A/P when the analysis relates to large firms and A/R when the analysis 
relates to SMEs. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 report results for large firms for the subsample of firms with high exposure to the U.K. Columns 2, 4, 6, 
8 and 10 report results for SMEs for the subsample of firms with high exposure to the U.K. All models include firm and time fixed effects. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A, and the sample spans the period 2009-2018. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported 
below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Apr-11 Apr-12 Apr-13 Apr-14 Apr-15 
Variables A/P A/R A/P A/R A/P A/R A/P A/R A/P A/R  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Large x Post 0.041 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.003 
 
0.086 
 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.148) 
 
(0.249) 
 
SME x Post 
 
-0.0006 
 
0.015 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.031 
 
0.023   
(0.019) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.058)            
Post -0.104* -0.001 0.060 0.005 -0.016 -0.001 0.100 0.0004 -0.004 -0.021  
(0.056) (0.023) (0.089) (0.021) (0.042) (0.015) (0.307) (0.001) (0.195) (0.026)            
Constant 0.320*** 0.161*** 0.311*** 0.161*** 0.307*** 0.164*** 0.340*** 0.167*** 0.369*** 0.169***  
(0.1262) (0.001) (0.122) (0.011) (0.119) (0.011) (0.117) (0.015) (0.157) (0.016)            
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,978 1,962 2,522 2,502 3,086 3,058 3,683 3,644 4,252 4,211 
R-squared 0.507 0.483 0.508 0.457 0.506 0.395 0.520 0.418 0.342 0.253 
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 Panel B. Placebo Cut-offs: 
In the models below we present results of placebo versions of our main analysis. To remove the actual treatment effect we remove firms in a revenue 
and asset band around the actual regulatory cutoffs. The band is £50 M and £100 M in columns (1) through (8) and columns (9) through (12), 
respectively. We create treatment and control groups by applying placebo asset and revenue cutoffs of £100 M and £200 M above the actual 
regulatory cutoffs in columns (1) through (4) and columns (5) through (12) respectively.  The dependent variable is A/P for large firms and A/R for 
SMEs. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 report results for firms in the full sample. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 report results for firms with high 
exposure to the U.K. All models include firm and time fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A, and the sample spans the period 2009-
2018. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Deletion Cutoff: Revenue: 86 m; Assets: 68 m Revenue: 86 m; Assets: 68 m Revenue: 136 m; Assets: 118 m 
Treatment Cutoff: Revenues: 136 m; Assets: 118 m Revenues: 236 m; Assets: 218 m Revenues: 236 m; Assets: 218 m 
Sample: All High UK All High UK All High UK All High UK All High UK All High UK 
Dep. Variable: A/P A/P A/R A/R A/P A/P A/R A/R A/P A/P A/R A/R 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
Large x Post 0.024* -0.009     0.019* 0.021**     0.010 0.032     
 (0.013) (0.008)     (0.008) (0.010)     (0.007) (0.021)     
SME x Post     0.011 0.002     -0.002 -0.0017     -0.0142 -0.0089 
     (0.009) (0.008)     (0.007) (0.007)     (0.011) (0.008) 
             
Post -0.014 0.007 0.009 0.006 -0.007 -0.021 0.011 0.0035 -0.009 -0.033 0.004 0.0068 
 (0.020) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.025) (0.005) (0.010) 
             
Constant 0.105*** 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.087*** 0.102*** 0.132*** 0.149*** 
 (0.003) (0.030) (0.011) (0.023) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.023) (0.003) (0.005) (0.013) -0.030 
             
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,970 1,706 4,923 2,202 4,970 2,197 4,923 2,202 3,999 2,197 3,964 1,706 
R-squared 0.571 0.332 0.814 0.298 0.871 0.392 0.814 0.379 0.652 0.392 0.495 0.332 
 
